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Book Review
Elise Kimberling Wirtschafter, Social Identity in Imperial
Russia, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997. Pp. 288.
$35.00 (ISBN 0-87580-231-1).
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In her detailed and vivid account of social identities,
Elise Kimberling Wirtschafter describes an imperial Russian society
that is not backward, isolated and static, but vital and dynamic.
The author highlights the porous boundaries, indeterminate definitions,
and flexible structures that characterize imperial Russian society
in her thorough account of juridical categoriesfrom the nobility
and clergy to the intelligentsia, peasants, and townspeople. Imperial
Russia was a fragmented "society" that consisted of "bundles of
amorphous, changeable, and often contradictory legal rights and
social identities" (171). While she admits that the juridical categories
shaped people's everyday lives, they failed to do what some might
have hoped or expected, that is: 1) integrate people by providing
them a place in the imperial framework; 2) overcome local identities
and extend state power and control; 3) provide the basis of a civil
society through the development of cohesive social groups capable
of articulating collective interests. |
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The tsars attempted to integrate
the diversity of their subjects by delineating social categories
that dictated everything from education and job opportunities to
tax and military obligations. Yet, in actuality, each of these juridical
categories was difficult to define. With the exception of the highest
aristocratic, service, and episcopal elites, lesser nobles, lower
military ranks, petty officials, and parish clergy blended imperceptibly
into the general population. The boundaries delimiting factory workers
from other laboring groups such as lesser townspeople and peasant
migrants were indistinct, indeterminate, and changeable even after
large-scale industrial development got under way in the late nineteenth
century. Military regiments and parish clergy, due to their economic
dependence on local resources, remained deeply embedded in civilian
and lay communities. The noble estate, in the words of one important
official, "is so boundless that at one end it touches the foot of
the throne and at the other is almost lost in the peasantry" (67).
These categories hardly reflected social reality or the existence
of groups with distinct, coherent identities. |
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If this description of social identities
makes the imperial Russian empire look fragmented, fragile and unstable,
the author maintains nonetheless that the dynamic prism of juridical
society helps to explain the stability and effectiveness of the
autocratic system. Fluctuating definitions and porous institutions
gave people a certain freedom to violate official boundaries and
change legal identities in order to survive, define a social position,
and perhaps even prosper. The tsar's subjects took liberty to evade
official obligations, disregard legal prescriptions, and violate
formal and informal social boundaries whenever they considered policy
unjust or impractical. For example, in order to survive, soldiers
collaborated with officers to "cheat" the state by neglecting service
duties so that they could earn money to simply keep themselves fed. |
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What gave the system coherence
was simply the person of the monarch, the sole point of system-wide
administrative integration. Personalized authority remained in place
for two centuries (and, indeed, into the Soviet period and beyond)
because many believed that it was preferable to compete for access
and conduct informal consultations and negotiations rather than
to set limits on autocratic power. There were obvious advantages
to personalized authority for the tsar who defined administrative
and social power, and for the tsar's various administrators who
(in an enormous empire where administrative oversight was difficult)
were de facto lawmakers as well. But while everyone appeared powerful
in this system, they were all also strikingly vulnerable, as the
author brings out well. On the one hand, the ruling classes were
always vulnerable to downward mobility. For the nobility, "formal
rights and service obligations were never contractual but discretionary
and hence provisional" (35). On the other hand, the autocrat's authority
disintegrated when people lost faith in the myth of the good tsar.
During and after the emancipation of the serfs, it became clear
to both peasants and landowning nobles that they no longer could
expect a benevolent monarch to protect their rights and privileges.
As they became more disillusioned and resentful over the years,
belief in the monarch's good intentions faded and the myth of the
good tsar began to unravel, thus inviting revolution. |
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When considering the disintegration
of the imperial system, Wirtschafter emphasizes the failure of personalized
authority. Throughout the imperial period, the basic obligation
of the tsars was to be good and merciful, to respond to their subjects'
grievances and offer protection, while the basic right of all imperial
subjects was to present complaints and petition their ruler. In
this context, the events of Bloody Sunday in 1905 are especially
significant. "The gunning down of peaceful petitioners seeking to
address the sovereign made it painfully clear that the efforts of
ordinary people to use paternalistic images to protect themselves
and effect positive improvements in their lives had come to naught"
(157). This dynamic and fluid society, held together only by a trust
in the personalized authority of the monarch, began to disintegrate.
The history of legal-administrative society, the author argues,
is one of localized and fragmented communities that by the early
twentieth century could neither replace the desacrilized monarch
nor mediate mass discontent. |
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If the absence of stable formal
structures hastened the collapse of the imperial order, the flexibility
and vitality of informal structures nonetheless held it together
for centuries. Wirtschafter urges historians to look closely at
the particulars of the Russian environmentone where economic
activity involved risk, where resource allocation and shortage required
rule breaking, where the diversity of local circumstances required
personalized authority. In such an environment, informal ties often
served the needs of people better than formal rules. What is especially
valuable about this book is how it describes the complex reality
that existed beyond the juridical categories of social identity,
and its suggestion that historians might have more to learn about
Russian society from its informal structures than its formal ones.
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Golfo Alexopoulos
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University of South
Florida
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